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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 20, 2010 we marked—I cannot say celebrated—the
sesquicentennial of South Carolina’s secession. By the end of February
1861, six other states had followed South Carolina into the Confederacy.
Most scholars fully understand that slavery was at the root of secession
and the war that followed. As Abraham Lincoln noted in his second
inaugural in 1865, “[o]ne-eighth of the whole population were colored
slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the
southern part of it. These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful
interest. All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war.”1
What Lincoln admitted in 1865, Confederate leaders asserted much
earlier. After secession but before the Civil War broke out, Alexander
H. Stephens, the Confederate vice president and one of the two most
perceptive and brightest men in the Confederate government,2 forcefully
set out the reasons for secession in his famous “Cornerstone Speech.”
Here, Stephens tied slavery to race, making clear that the cornerstone of
the Confederacy was not merely chattel slavery, but the total

∗ President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy and Senior Fellow
in the Government Law Center, Albany Law School; John Hope Franklin Visiting Professor in
American Legal History, Duke Law School, Fall 2012.
1. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Second Inaugural Address, in 8 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 332 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
2. The other one was Judah P. Benjamin, who held a number of positions in the Confederate
cabinet and then enjoyed a second career as one of the leading barristers in England.
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subordination of black people for the benefit of white people. In this
sense the Confederacy was the political grandparent of Nazi Germany
and apartheid-era South Africa— regimes founded on the assumption of
the racial and ethnic superiority of the ruling class and the utter
inferiority and subordination of other races and groups. Thus Stephens
declared that, “Our new government is founded upon . . . its foundations
are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not
equal to the white man; that slavery —subordination to the superior race
—is his natural and normal condition.”3
Stephens denounced the northern claims (which he incorrectly
attributed to Thomas Jefferson) that the “enslavement of the African was
in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially,
morally, and politically.”4 He unabashedly asserted: “Our new
government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea.”5 Stephens
argued that it was “insanity” to believe “that the negro is equal” or that
slavery was wrong.6 He proudly predicted that the Confederate
Constitution “has put at rest, forever, all the agitating questions relating
to our peculiar institution—African slavery as it exists amongst us—the
proper status of the negro in our form of civilization.”7
Stephens only echoed South Carolina’s declaration, explaining that
it was leaving the Union because
A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the
States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high
office of President of the United States, whose opinions and purposes
are hostile to slavery. He is to be entrusted with the administration of
the common Government, because he has declared that that
“Government cannot endure permanently half slave, half free,” and
that the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course
of ultimate extinction.8

3. Alexander H. Stephens, The Corner Stone Speech (Mar. 21, 1861), reprinted in HENRY
CLEVELAND, ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE. WITH LETTERS AND SPEECHES,
BEFORE, DURING, AND SINCE THE WAR 717, 721 (Philadelphia, National Publishing Co. 1886).
4. Id. (emphasis in original).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South
Carolina from the Federal Union (1861), reprinted in J.A. MAY & J.R. FAUNT, SOUTH CAROLINA
SECEDES 76-81 (1960), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp (last
visited Sept. 24, 2011). This was adopted four days after the state officially seceded. The
Declarations of Secession for Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas are conveniently
found at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/csapage.asp.
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In other words, South Carolina was leaving the Union because Lincoln
believed slavery was wrong and should one day—in the far distant
future—be ended.
Shortly after South Carolina left the Union, Georgia did the same.
Beginning with the second sentence of its Declaration of Secession,
Georgia made it clear that slavery was the force behind secession:
For the last ten years we have had numerous and serious causes of
complaint against our non-slave-holding confederate States with
reference to the subject of African slavery. They have endeavored to
weaken our security, to disturb our domestic peace and tranquility, and
persistently refused to comply with their express constitutional
obligations to us in reference to that property, and by the use of their
power in the Federal Government have striven to deprive us of an
equal enjoyment of the common Territories of the Republic. This
hostile policy of our confederates has been pursued with every
circumstance of aggravation which could arouse the passions and
excite the hatred of our people, and has placed the two sections of the
Union for many years past in the condition of virtual civil war.9

Mississippi emphatically made the same point, starting with the second
sentence of its Declaration: “Our position is thoroughly identified with
the institution of slavery—the greatest material interest of the world.”10
Despite the almost universal understanding of serious scholars that
slavery and racial subordination were at the root of secession and the
Civil War—and the almost endless statements of Confederate leaders
supporting this analysis—a considerable number of Americans cling to
the belief that secession was about “states’ rights,” and that southerners
left the Union to escape a tyrannical national government that was
trampling on their rights. Advocates of this old fashioned, and
simultaneously modern, neo-Confederate ideology rarely discuss the
substance of southern states’ rights claims, because they will either lead
to an intellectual dead end, or lead back to slavery.
The relationship of secession to states’ rights is often
misunderstood, especially by those who argue that the slave states left
9. Georgia Secession (1861), reprinted in 1 FRED C. AINSWORTH & JOSEPH W. KIRKLEY,
THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE ARMIES 81-85 (Ser. 4, 1900), available at http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/
cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Georgia;rgn=full%20text;idno=waro0127;
didno=waro0127;view=image;seq=0093.
10. A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of the
State of Mississippi from the Federal Union (1861), reprinted in JOURNAL OF THE STATE
CONVENTION 86-88 (Jackson, E. Barksdale 1861), available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/
imls/msconven/menu.html (last visited May 6, 2012).
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the Union to protect their states’ rights. The southern states did not
leave the Union because the national government was trampling on their
“rights.” The states that left the union never asserted that they were
being denied their “states’ rights” —that the national government had
obliterated the lines been between national power and state power. Nor
did the southern states complain that the national government was too
powerful and so it threatened the sovereignty of the state governments.
On the contrary, as I set out below, the southern states mostly
complained that the northern states were asserting their states’ rights and
that the national government was not powerful enough to counter these
northern claims. Similarly, the secessionists did not complain that an
oppressive national government was infringing on the civil liberties of
southern citizens; rather the complaint was that the national government
refused to suppress the civil liberties of northern citizens.
When considering federal law and policy in 1860, the southern
states should have had almost no complaints. Since 1850, they had won
almost every debate in Congress and almost every federal law dealing
with slavery had benefited the South. A series of Supreme Court
decisions on slave transit,11 black citizenship,12 the right of masters to
take slaves into the territories,13 and the constitutionality of the Fugitive
Slave Law of 185014 had all favored the South. Significantly, two of
these decisions were unanimous, even though throughout the period four
of the nine Justices were northerners. Two of the northerners dissented
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Court’s most proslavery decision of the
decade.15 But, by 1860, one of these dissenters, Benjamin R. Curtis, had
left the Court and been replaced by an adamantly proslavery northern
Democrat, Nathan Clifford.
II. THE 1850S: THE HIGH POINT OF PROSLAVERY NATIONALISM
The 1850s was a remarkable decade for supporters of slavery. In
three areas of law—involving the territories, the recovery of fugitive
slaves, and the right to travel with slaves—all three branches of the
national government expanded the rights of slave owners. At the same

11. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851).
12. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
13. Id.
14. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
15. Arguably, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), was equally as proslavery.
For a discussion of this point, see Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v.
Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247 (1994).
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time, in two other areas of law, the national government dramatically
restricted the rights of free blacks.
By the end of the decade, slavery was legal in all the federal
territories, the federal government was vigorously enforcing a draconian
fugitive slave law that had enabled hundreds of masters to recover their
runaways, and the Supreme Court had expanded the right of masters to
travel in the free states with their slaves. Furthermore, the Court hinted
that it would guarantee masters even greater rights of transit, when given
the opportunity to do so.16 Congress prohibited blacks from testifying
on their own behalf at a fugitive slave hearing, suspended the writ of
habeas corpus for alleged fugitives throughout the nation to remand
them to slave catchers, and provided harsh punishments for anyone
interfering with the return of a fugitive slave. Meanwhile, the Supreme
Court ruled that blacks, even if free, and even if accorded equal rights of
citizenship in their own states, would never be considered citizens of the
United States, and in effect had no rights under the Constitution. At the
same that it denied any constitutional rights to free blacks, the Court
held that slavery was a specially protected institution under the
Constitution. Under the Court’s reasoning, Congress could, and should,
protect slavery property in the territories, but could never restrict it.
A.

Restrictions and Limitations on Slavery in 1850

In 1850, southerners could not have imagined they would be so
successful in securing federal support for slavery over the next ten years.
At the beginning of the decade, slave owners were closed out of virtually
all of the existing federal territories. The United States had acquired
vast amounts of land from Mexico, but the area was closed to slavery.
During the Mexican War, the House of Representatives had passed the
Wilmot Proviso, banning slavery from the new territories. The Proviso
never made it through the Senate, where the South had a majority from
early 1845 until mid-1848.17 But, even after the North gained parity in
the Senate, it was impossible to pass any law organizing the new
territories. Thus, the new territories remained unorganized with no

16. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 468 (Nelson, J., concurring).
17. The admission of Florida on March 3, 1845 gave the South a one state majority in the
Senate. Texas admission on December 29, 1845 gave the South a two state majority. The South
maintained this two state majority until December 28, 1846 when Iowa entered the Union, and
parity was not reached until Wisconsin became a state on May 26, 1848. This history undermines
the notion, perpetuated by many scholars, that the admission of California ended a history of parity
in the Senate. With the opening of the Mexican Cession to slavery it was perfectly possible to
imagine new slaves states entering the Union in the southwest.
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functioning government. Meanwhile, thousands of people poured into
California after gold was discovered there. With no territorial
government, there were no laws allowing slavery and the only existing
law was that of Mexico, which prohibited slavery. Thus, slave-owners
felt cut out of the gold rush and unable to move into what would later
become Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, and much of Colorado.
Slavery was also officially excluded in all of the land left over from
the Louisiana Purchase except the Indian Territory, but white slave
owners had little opportunity to move there. Nor was slavery allowed in
the Oregon country—the present-day states of Oregon, Washington, and
part of Idaho. Southerners believed they should be entitled to settle the
new lands acquired from Mexico, especially because southerners had
disproportionately fought in the Mexican War. Indeed the two heroes of
the Mexican War were Zachary Taylor, a Kentuckian by birth who
owned sugar plantations and many slaves in Louisiana,18 and Winfield
Scott, who was a slaveowner from Virginia.19 Many southerners also
believed that the Compromise of 1820, which banned slavery north of
the southern boundary of Missouri, unconstitutionally deprived them of
a right to settle land owned by all Americans.20
In 1850, masters had a constitutional right to recover slaves
wherever they could find them. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793
authorized federal judges and state and local magistrates at any level to
hear fugitive slaves cases, and remand runaways to those who claimed
them.21 In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,22 the Supreme Court had given
masters a right of recaption to seize fugitive slaves wherever they found
them and peacefully take them south without any judicial
superintendence.23 However, this right was mostly impossible to assert
in taking slaves that had traveled far into the North. To recover slaves
who were more than a day’s ride from the South, masters needed the
help of law enforcement officers. But, after Prigg, most northern states
passed laws closing their jails and courtrooms to slave catchers and
prohibiting states officials from helping to recover runaway slaves.24

18. See JOHN S.D. EISENHOWER, ZACHARY TAYLOR (2008).
19. See JOHN S.D. EISENHOWER, AGENT OF DESTINY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF GENERAL
WINFIELD SCOTT (1999).
20. JAMES A. DORR, JUSTICE TO THE SOUTH! AN ADDRESS 10 (New York, 1856).
21. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
22. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
23. For a full discussion of the proslavery implications of Prigg, see Finkelman, supra note
15. See also Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 24 (1993).
24. Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of a
Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 CIV. WAR HIS. 5 (1979).
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Typical of this state activity was Massachusetts’s “Latimer Law,” which
prohibited any state judge from hearing a case under the Fugitive Slave
Law of 1793, or any sheriff or other official from arresting a fugitive
slave.25 Any judge, sheriff, or other state or local official violating this
law could be fined and imprisoned.26 Thus, while southerners had a
right to recover runaway slaves anywhere in the nation, they lacked the
ability to easily do so. Without federal enforcement, southerners seeking
runaways would be frustrated by northern states’ rights.
By 1850, most of the free states had adopted the principle that no
one could be held as a slave without positive law. 27 This principle was
first articulated by Chief Justice Lord Mansfield in Somerset v.
Stewart,28 which was decided in Britain before the American Revolution
and thus was part of the common law at the time of Independence.
Under the Somerset principle, masters could not travel with their slaves
through most of the North without the risk of losing them. During and
after the Revolution, some of the northern states had made
accommodations for visiting masters. Pennsylvania granted them a right
of transit of up to six months29 and New York gave them nine months.30
But in 1841, New York repealed its law31 and Pennsylvania did the same
in 1847.32 Thus, by 1850, southern masters felt deprived of their right to
travel throughout the nation with their slaves. Similarly, under the
Missouri Compromise, they were prohibited from taking their slaves
into the western territories, even for a visit.33

25. An Act Further to Protect Personal Liberty, 1843 Mass. Acts ch 69 at 33.
26. Id. For a full history of these laws, see THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE
PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH, 1780-1861 (1974).
27. For detailed discussions of these laws and the common law evolution of this principle in
the North, see PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY
(1981).
28. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.). For a discussion of this case, see
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 17601848 (1977).
29. 1 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 492-96 (Philadelphia, 1810).
30. 1799 NY Laws, ch. 62., reenacted in 1817 N.Y. Laws, ch. 137.
31. 1841 N.Y. Laws, ch. 247.
32. Act of March 3, 1847, 1847 Pa. Laws 206. For detailed discussions of these laws and the
common law evolution of this principle in the North, see FINKELMAN, supra note 27.
33. As the facts of Dred Scott show, some masters, like Captain John Emerson, did take their
slaves into the area, especially those like Captain John Emerson, who were posted at military bases.
Most masters, however, did not venture into the area with their property. For example, in an
unreported case a court in Muscatine, Iowa emancipated the slave Jim White whose master brought
him there before statehood. The Negro Case, BLOOMINGTON HERALD, Nov. 18, 1848. See also J.P.
Walton, Unwritten History of Bloomington (Now Muscatine), in Early Days, 1 Annals of Iowa 4044 (1882).
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Thus, as the 1850s began, slaveowners had reason to complain
about the legal structure of the nation. In their own states, slaveowners
were secure. Despite annoying denunciations of slavery by abolitionists
and antislavery Senators and Congressmen, the national government had
no constitutional power to interfere with slavery in the existing states.
The states’ rights of the southern states were secure. But, southerners
felt their federal constitutional rights were at risk when they entered the
free states because those states emancipated any slaves voluntarily
brought within their jurisdiction.34 Thus, southerners felt that the
northern states were denying them the right to travel with their
constitutional sanctioned property. Similarly, if their slaves ran away to
the free states, those states refused to fulfill their constitutional
obligation by cooperating in the return of fugitive slaves.
B.

The Great Proslavery Shift of the 1850s

In the 1850s, supporters of slavery won huge victories in Congress,
which legalized slavery throughout the west. Congress further protected
the rights of masters to recover fugitive slaves with a new and
powerfully nationalistic fugitive slave law. Added to this were Supreme
Court decisions which made slavery a specially protected institution
under the Constitution, allowed slavery in all the federal territories,
concluded that free blacks had virtually no rights under the Constitution
and could never be considered citizens of the United States, and
undermined the right of free states to emancipate visiting slaves.
1. The Compromise of 1850
In January of 1850, Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky introduced a
series of resolutions to settle the pending issues before the nation.35
Clay’s resolutions, and his Omnibus Bill that followed, overwhelmingly
favored the South. Clay’s Omnibus Bill ultimately collapsed, and was
revived in a series of separate laws known as the Compromise of 1850.36
The Compromise organized the new territories without any ban on
slavery, thus opening more than 400,000 square miles to masters and
their bondsmen and bondswomen. This eviscerated the Missouri
Compromise, which Clay himself had crafted in 1820, by allowing
34. FINKELMAN, supra note 27.
35. Paul Finkelman, The Appeasement of 1850, in CONGRESS AND THE CRISIS OF THE 1850S
36 (Paul Finkelman & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2012).
36. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 98-101 (Don E. Fehrenbacher
ed., 1976).
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slavery north of the 36° 30' parallel.37 Much of the Mexican Cession—
what became Utah and Nevada and parts of Colorado and Wyoming—
was north of the Missouri Compromise line. In addition to this, the
Compromise gave Texas tens of thousands of acres of land and ten
million dollars so that the government in Austin could pay off its prestatehood debts.38
In return for these sweeping concessions to slavery in the west, the
Compromise brought California into the Union as a free state. This was
hardly a concession to the free states, however, because by the time
Congress passed the California bill there were nearly 100,000 free
people there and at most, a few hundred slaves.39 California was
destined to be a free state and even southern nationalists knew this. This
gave the free states a two vote majority in the Senate, but there was no
reason to believe that this would be permanent. The rest of the Mexican
Cession was large enough to accommodate five or six or even more new
slave states.40
The Compromise also dealt with two non-territorial issues
involving slavery. The new Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was one of the
most repressive and unfair federal laws in our history.41 The law
provided for the appointment of federal commissioners in every county
who, along with judges, were required to “hear and determine the case”
in “a summary manner” without a jury.42 Under this law, the slave
owner or his agent had only to present “satisfactory proof” that the
person claimed was a fugitive slave.43 This could be done by
“deposition or affidavit” certified “in writing” before any judge or
magistrate in the home state of the slave owner.44 The potential for
fraud, or even mistaken identity, was huge. The claimant could bring
any black who fit the description in the “deposition or affidavit” before a
judge and demand the right to remove the person as a fugitive slave.45

37. Finkelman, Appeasement of 1850, supra note 35, at 54; Paul Finkelman, The Cost of
Compromise and the Covenant with Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 845 (2011).
38. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 49, 9 Stat. 446.
39. Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with Death, supra note 37, at 862.
40. For a more detailed discussion of the 1850 debate, see id., and PAUL FINKELMAN,
MILLARD FILLMORE (2011).
41. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Alleged fugitives were prohibited from testifying at their own
hearings, even to explain that the wrong person had been seized.46 The
law also prohibited any judge—state or federal—from issuing a writ of
habeas corpus for an alleged slave. This was the first time Congress had
ever suspended the writ of habeas corpus—and it was done in clear
violation of the procedures set out in the U.S. Constitution.47 The habeas
provision of the Constitution envisioned a suspension for an immediate
emergency caused by an invasion or rebellion. But in 1850 Congress
indefinitely suspended the Great Writ throughout the whole country
even though there was no immediate crisis.
Under the law, anyone aiding a fugitive slave or interfering with the
rendition process was subject to a $1,000 fine plus court costs, six
months in jail, and civil damages of $1,000 to be paid to the slave owner
for each slave who was not recovered.48 If literally enforced, a
northerner could be fined, sued, or jailed for merely giving a black
person walking down the road a piece of bread or a cup of water, or
allowing the black traveler to sleep in his barn. Hiring a black who
turned out to be a fugitive came with enormous potential costs. In an
age when there were no meaningful forms of identification, and thus no
way to know if a black was free or a fugitive, the law effectively
encouraged northerners—even free black northerners —to refuse to hire
blacks because they might turn out to be fugitive slaves. The harsh
penalties, and the minimal standards of proof, could force northern
whites to assume that all blacks they saw were fugitives even though in
1850 there were more than 150,000 free blacks living in the North.49
From the perspective of blacks and many white northerners, the Act of
1850 had brought the law of slavery into the free states and required
northerners to do the bidding of southerners.

46. Id. (“In no trial or hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be
admitted in evidence.”).
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). See Paul Finkelman, Limiting
Rights in Times of Crisis: Our Civil War Experience – A History Lesson for a Post-9-11 America, 2
CARDOZO PUBLIC L. POLICY & ETHICS J. 25 (2003).
48. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 § 7.
49. The Court had essentially held this in Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847).
Van Zandt, an Ohio farmer, gave a ride in his wagon to nine blacks walking along the road. Id. at
219. They were all fugitives belonging to Jones, a Kentucky slave owner. Id. at 218. Jones
successfully sued Van Zandt for the value of one of the slaves who permanently escaped and the
cost of recapturing the rest. Id. at 220. Van Zandt argued that he had no notice they were slaves
and that, in Ohio, all people were presumptively free. Id. at 221. The Supreme Court upheld the
judgment against Van Zandt, and thus put northerners on notice that they should not assume blacks
in their states were free. Id.
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The statute created, for the first time, a national system of law
enforcement through the appointment of one or more federal
commissioners in every county in the nation. The Act of 1850
authorized the commissioners to hear fugitive slave cases and summon
sufficient force to secure the return of runaways. Federal marshals and
commissioners were empowered to call on the militia, the army, or
create a posse to enforce the law. The statute gratuitously declared that
“all good citizens are hereby commanded to aid and assist in the prompt
and efficient execution of this law,” although there was no clear remedy
if citizens refused to help enforce the law.50 If these measures failed,
however, and marshals were unable to prevent a rescue, they could be
held personally liable for the value of any slave who escaped their
custody. No other federal law had ever provided such penalties for
officers who were unable to implement a law.
Someone could be dragged south as a slave without ever being
permitted to offer his or her own voice as evidence that he or she was
free. The outrageousness of the testimony provision was matched by the
provision for paying the commissioners and judges who heard these
cases. If a judge ruled in favor of the alleged slave, thus setting him or
her free, the judge was entitled to a five-dollar fee.51 If the judge ruled
for the master, he got a ten-dollar fee.52 Most northerners viewed this as
a blatant attempt to bribe the courts.53
The Fugitive Slave Act was an utterly one-sided law that threatened
the liberty of every black in the North, while also jeopardizing their
white friends, neighbors, and employers. The “compromise” offered in
return for this law was a ban on the public sale of slaves in the District of
Columbia. This ban would not harm slave owners or the system of
slavery, but merely end the embarrassment of having slaves marched
through the national capital in chains or publicly auctioned off in the
shadow of the White House and Congress.54 Northerners (and even a
few southerners) were deeply offended by this. But southerners
understood that the ban was merely symbolic because slave owners in

50. See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 § 5.
51. Id. § 8.
52. Id.
53. The differential payment was based on the fact that commissioners were paid by
collecting fees (rather than a salary) and it took much more time to fill out the paperwork necessary
to return a fugitive slave than to set a black free. While the different fees made economic sense,
they created the appearance that justice was for sale in the North. The payment scale was a public
relations disaster for the national government and the Fillmore administration.
54. See generally the essays in IN THE SHADOW OF FREEDOM: THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY IN
THE NATIONAL CAPITAL (Paul Finkelman & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2011).
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the District could easily take their slaves to Virginia for sale.55 They
could also privately sell their slaves. Southern opposition to ending the
trade in the District was not based on the fear that it would actually harm
the system of slavery—because it clearly would not—but as a matter of
proslavery principles. Ending the D.C. slave trade would be an
admission that buying and selling slaves was morally wrong—which
extreme southern nationalists would not admit and did not believe.
At the same time, shrewd southerners may have understood the ban
on the trade in the national capital would actually benefit them. The ban
on the trade virtually ended the demands of northern Congressmen for
an end to slavery in the District of Columbia. Thus, what was sold to the
northerners as a victory was strategically valuable to the South.
In sum, the Compromise of 1850 was an enormous victory to the
South. It opened up vast amounts of land to slavery, much of it north of
the Missouri Compromise line. This territory would eventually
accommodate four full states and parts of three others, but it might easily
have been used to create six or seven new slave states. It transferred ten
million dollars from the national government to the state of Texas, which
constituted the largest transfer of money from the national government
to a state since the nation began. The new fugitive slave law committed
the national government to spending huge sums of money, created a new
level of court officers, and vastly expanded the reach and power of the
national government, just to accommodate slaveowners. The law also
trampled on states’ rights, reaffirming the Supreme Court’s holding in
Prigg that the northern states had no right to protect the liberty of their
black residents and citizens, even those who were born free. The law
provided no penalties for southerners who purposefully kidnapped or
mistakenly seized free blacks, but provided harsh penalties for
northerners who tried to prevent the removal of their neighbors, friends,
and relatives, even if they believed they were free. The law trampled on
the rights of the free states by sending federal commissioners, marshals,
and troops into northern communities to round up blacks.
In return for these huge concessions, Congress banned the public
slave trade in the District of Columbia, which as noted above, had no
impact on the institution of slavery and did not prevent masters from
selling their slaves across the river in Alexandria. The North also gained
when Congress admitted California as a free state. But this result was
hardly a concession to the North, because everyone understood

55. A. Glenn Crothers, The 1846 Retrocession of Alexandria: Protecting Slavery and the
Slave Trade in the District of Columbia, in IN THE SHADOW OF FREEDOM, supra note 54, at 141.
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Californians wanted to enter the Union as a free state. Even Robert
Toombs of Georgia did “not consider the admission of California an
aggression on the South” because he acknowledged that the new state’s
residents were overwhelmingly opposed to slavery.56
More
significantly, Congress and President Millard Fillmore refused to
consider a proposed constitution from citizens of New Mexico, which
would also have led to that territory entering the Union as a free state.57
2. The Kansas-Nebraska Act
Four years after the Compromise of 1850—which from a northern
perspective might better be called the Appeasement of 185058—the
South made new and spectacular gains in the Kansas-Nebraska Act.59
This law provided for the organization of territorial government in the
remaining western lands, which included all or part of the present-day
states of Nebraska, Kansas, South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana,
Wyoming, Colorado, and Idaho. In 1820, Congress had banned slavery
in all of this territory as part of the Missouri Compromise. Extreme
proslavery southerners had long argued that the Missouri Compromise
was unconstitutional because Congress could not deprive them of the
right to enter a federal territory with their property. This argument had
little resonance in the North or among moderate southerners, who
accepted the power of Congress to regulate the territories. Furthermore,
if Congress could prohibit slavery in some territories, it could
specifically allow slavery and protect it in other territories. In the
Florida Territory, for example, federal and territorial authorities
prosecuted the ship captain Jonathan Walker when he tried to help a boat
load of slaves escape to the British West Indies, where they would have
been free.60 After his conviction, Walker was branded on his hand with
the letters S.S., for “slave stealer.”61 Such support for slavery in some of
the territories was seen, at least by moderate southerners, as a reasonable
trade-off for banning slavery in other territories.
After the Mexican War, a number of moderate southerners seemed
willing to simply extend the Missouri Compromise line though the new
territories, but southern extremists opposed this, and they were joined by
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
(1998).
61.

FINKELMAN, MILLARD FILLMORE, supra note 40, at 114.
Id. at 83-85, 89.
Finkelman, Appeasement of 1850, supra note 35.
Kansas–Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
ALVIN F. OICKLE, JONATHAN WALKER: THE MAN WITH THE BRANDED HAND 1-13
Id.
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two northern doughface leaders. After Henry Clay’s Omnibus Bill
collapsed, Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois picked up the pieces of
Clay’s proposal and guided them through Congress one bill at a time.62
Thus, Douglas willingly opened all the new territories to slavery,
pleasing his southern friends and allies in the Democratic Party, and
positioning himself to run for president in 1856. Millard Fillmore, the
Whig accidental president, eagerly signed the compromise bills while
refusing to submit to Congress a constitution for New Mexico written by
a democratically elected convention in the territory because it would
have created a free state of New Mexico.63 Both men assumed their
relentless support of slavery in the Compromise package would
strengthen their presidential ambitious. Fillmore was unable to win the
Whig nomination in 1852, but Douglas, who was only thirty-nine years
old, was still building his career with the presidency as his ultimate goal.
Douglas furthered his presidential ambitions in 1854 by sponsoring
the Kansas-Nebraska Act. This law provided for the creation of
territorial governments in what would become most of the Great Plains
states. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 had banned slavery in all of
this area, but Douglas’s bill allowed slavery in all of the area. Douglas
said that the issue of slavery would be determined by “popular
sovereignty,” inviting proslavery and antislavery settlers to move there.64
The result was not a peaceful referendum on slavery, but a mini-Civil
War known as Bleeding Kansas.65 Aggressive supporters of slavery,
aided by the administrations of Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan,
created a proslavery government in the territory, even though a clear
majority of the settlers were northerners who opposed slavery.66
Eventually, Buchanan pushed for the admission of Kansas as a slave
state based on the Lecompton Constitution, which was written by a
fraudulently elected convention and ratified by an equally suspect
referendum.67
In 1858 Douglas would break with Buchanan over Lecompton, but
not because it would lead to a slave state in Kansas. Douglas famously
declared that he did not care whether slavery was voted “up or down.”68
62.
63.
(1976).
64.
65.
(2004).
66.
67.
68.

POTTER, supra note 36, at 109-11.
FINKELMAN, MILLARD FILLMORE, supra note 40, at 84; POTTER, supra note 36, at 110-11
POTTER, supra note 36, at 172-74.
NICOLE ETCHESON, BLEEDING KANSAS: CONTESTED LIBERTY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA
MICHAEL F. HOLT, FRANKLIN PIERCE (2010).
POTTER, supra note 36, at 297-328.
Id. at 349.
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Douglas objected to the Lecompton Constitution because it was written
and ratified by a patently fraudulent process and everyone in the United
States knew this. But, on the main principle—Popular Sovereignty—
Douglas, Buchanan, and almost every other Democrat leader agreed that
slavery was an issue for the settlers of the territories, not the Congress or
the president. It should be remembered that throughout this period,
Democrats controlled the Senate and had there been no secession, the
Democrats would have been able to block Lincoln at every turn.
Furthermore, the three state majority69 that northerners had in the
senate—the votes of six senators—was fragile and hardly dominant. A
solid South could always find a few northern senators—the four they
would need—to outvote the North on significant sectional issues.
Whatever the outcome of Kansas settlement, it is hard to see how
southerners could complain about the process. Fillmore and Douglas in
1850 and Pierce and Douglas in 1854 had opened up almost all the
territories to slavery. That southerners were unable to win the vote in
Kansas was a function of their preference for cotton over wheat; but that
did not mean they might not win the settlement race in other territories.
Most importantly, opening all the territories to slavery in 1850 in 1854
along with the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 reflected a Congress more
than willing to support the South. Whatever else southerners had to
complain about, they could not legitimately complain that Congress had
harmed their states’ rights, or slavery, in the previous decade.
3. The Supreme Court and Slavery in the 1850s
The Supreme Court heard a number of cases involving slavery in
the late 1840s and 1850s. With one minor exception,70 slaveowners won
every one of these cases and the Court overwhelmingly supported the
power of Congress to assist them in recovering fugitive slaves. In Jones
v. Van Zandt,71 a unanimous Court held that northerners could be held
liable for the fugitive slaves they aided even if they did not have any
“notice” that the person they helped was a fugitive. In this case, Van
Zandt, an Ohio farmer, had given a ride to a group of slaves walking
along a road in outside of Cincinnati.72 He was subsequently sued by the
owner, Jones, for the cost of recovering them and the value of one who

69. By this time Minnesota and Oregon had become free states, along with California, as nonslave states.
70. Norris v. Crocker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 429 (1851).
71. Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847).
72. Id. at 219.
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was never recovered.73 Van Zandt argued there was a presumption of
freedom for everyone in Ohio and thus he could not “know” that the
people he gave the ride to were fugitive slaves.74 The Court rejected this
argument, essentially applying the law of the South—that all blacks
were presumptively slaves—to the free states.75 The opinion was written
by Justice Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire, and even the antislavery
John McLean of Ohio accepted the result.
In Strader v. Graham,76 the Court considered for the first time the
thorny problem of slave transit into free states. The Constitution
allowed for the recovery of fugitive slaves, but said nothing about the
right to voluntarily take a slave to a free state. Strader involved three
slave musicians who, with the permission of their master (Graham), had
traveled on a number of occasions from Kentucky to Ohio and Indiana to
perform.77 After a number of such trips, they boarded Strader’s
steamboat, without Graham’s permission, and escaped.78 Graham won a
judgment in the Kentucky courts because Strader had allowed the slaves
on his ship without their master’s written permission, in violation of
Kentucky law.79 On appeal, Strader argued that the slaves had become
free under the Northwest Ordinance and the laws of Ohio and Indiana
when Graham allowed them to go to those free jurisdictions.80 This
argument was based on a legal theory, first developed in Somerset v.
Stewart81 by Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, that a slave became free
when taken to a free jurisdiction because there was no positive law
creating slavery, and once free, the former slave was always free. By
1850, almost every northern state had adopted this rule, as had a many
southern states.82 But by this time a number of slave state jurists and
politicians had begun to question the propriety of following this rule
when slaves returned from visits to free states.
In Strader, the Court faced the problem indirectly. The Kentucky
courts had ruled that the status of Graham’s slaves was not at issue, and
whether they were entitled to their freedom for previous trips to the
North could only be determined if they appeared before the state

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 220.
Id. at 221.
Id.
Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851).
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 85-86.
Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.).
The history of this rule is set out in FINKELMAN, supra note 27.
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courts.83 But until they appeared in a Kentucky court, they were
presumptively slaves. Therefore, Strader had violated Kentucky law by
allowing Graham’s slaves on his ship and he was liable to Graham for
their value.84 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it must defer to the
state of Kentucky on this matter, upholding the judgment against
Graham.85 Under this rule, the slave states were free to decide for
themselves who was a slave and who was not. In other words, the Court
gave the slave states sanction to ignore free state law, and perhaps
federal law, in determining who was a slave and who was not. The
decision implied that the slave states could ignore the Full Faith and
Credit provision of Article IV of the Constitution, just as Kentucky had
ignored the constitutions of Indiana and Ohio. The true proslavery
implications of this case would become apparent in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, six years later.
A year after Strader, the Court clarified an aspect of the
jurisprudence of fugitive slaves in Moore v. Illinois.86 In Prigg,87 the
Court had struck down all state personal liberty laws. In that case,
Justice Story had declared that no state could add to the requirements for
the return of fugitive slaves, and thus all personal liberty laws providing
due process for alleged fugitives were unconstitutional.88 Despite this
huge victory for slavery, in a concurring opinion Chief Justice Taney
complained that the decision would also prevent the free states from
helping in the return of fugitive slaves.89 But in Moore, the Court upheld
an Illinois statute which punished Illinois citizens for harboring fugitive
slaves.90 This was one more victory for slavery.
Five years later, the Court decided Dred Scott v. Sandford,91 the
most notoriously proslavery decision in the nation’s jurisprudence. The
outcome of the case—that Scott remained a slave—was plausibly
correct, based, if nothing else, on Strader v. Graham.92 Scott claimed
his freedom because he had lived in the free state of Illinois and in the

83. Strader, 51 U.S. at 89.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 96-97.
86. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
87. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
88. Id. at 625-26.
89. Id. at 627-28 (Taney, J., concurring).
90. Moore, 55 U.S. at 22.
91. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
92. Paul Finkelman, Was Dred Scott Correctly Decided? An “Expert Report” For the
Defendant, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1219 (2008); Paul Finkelman, Coming to Terms with Dred
Scott: A Response to Daniel A. Farber, 39 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 495 (2012).
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Wisconsin Territory (in what later became Minnesota) where slavery
was banned by the Compromise of 1820 (also called the Missouri
Compromise) and various other federal laws.93 The Court initially
planned to decide the case on the basis of Strader, and had it done so the
case would probably be long forgotten. But the southerners on the Court
insisted on a more comprehensive result, which led to Taney’s massive
and extraordinarily proslavery opinion.94 Speaking for the Court, Taney
held that 1) slavery was a specially protected property under the
Constitution; 2) free blacks could never be considered citizens of the
United States and essentially had “no rights” under the Constitution; 3)
that Congress had no power to ban slavery in the federal territories; 4)
no law in the territories could free slaves because that would be an
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment; and 5) that the
Missouri Compromise unconstitutionally banned slavery in the federal
territories, and by implication the ban on slavery in the Act creating the
Oregon Territory was also unconstitutional. This was a sweeping
proslavery opinion that settled the issue of slavery in the territories by
allowing slavery in all the territories.
A concurring opinion by Justice Nelson of New York also directly
telegraphed how the Court would rule on the issue of slave transit.
Nelson noted at the very end of his opinion:
A question has been alluded to, on the argument, namely: the right of
the master with his slave of transit into or through a free State, on
Business or commercial pursuits, or in the exercise of a Federal right,
or the discharge of a Federal duty, being a citizen of the United States,
which is not before us. This question depends upon different
considerations and principles from the one in hand, and turns upon the
rights and privileges secured to a common citizen of the republic under
the Constitution of the United States. When that question arises, we
shall be prepared to decide it.95

The implication was clear: as soon as the Court had an opportunity, it
would guarantee that masters could travel anywhere in the United States
with their slaves. In his “House Divided Speech,”96 Abraham Lincoln
predicted that the logic of Dred Scott would lead to legalizing slavery in

93. These statutes are set out in PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF
HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 8-10 (1997).
94. The best discussion of the internal politics of the Court on this is DON E. FEHRENBACHER,
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978).
95. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 468 (Nelson, J., concurring).
96. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, A House Divided: Speech at Springfield, Illinois, in 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 1, at 461.
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the North through the “next Dred Scott decision.”97 Nelson’s opinion
certainly made this seem likely.
The final presecession decision on slavery was Ableman v. Booth,98
arguably the most anti-states’ rights decision since Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee,99 McCulloch v. Maryland,100 and Cohens v. Virginia.101 But the
difference between the cases is striking. Martin, McCulloch, and
Cohens were seen as attacks on the sovereignty of southern states,
leading to complaints by some Virginians that the Court had eviscerated
the rights of the states. Ableman was directed at northern states and
supported the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. The case began when
Sherman Booth, an antislavery editor in Milwaukee, helped lead a mob
that rescued a fugitive slave name Joshua Glover, who had been in
federal custody.102 United States Marshal Stephen Ableman then
arrested Booth. At this point, the Wisconsin Supreme Court intervened,
freeing Booth with a writ of habeas corpus.103 There, the Wisconsin
Court declared that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was
unconstitutional.104 The Wisconsin Supreme Court then refused to send
a record of the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court did not decide the case until 1859, when Chief Justice Taney
emphatically asserted:
No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party
is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any right to
interfere with him, or to require him to be brought before them. And if
the authority of a State, in the form of judicial process or otherwise,
should attempt to control the marshal or other authorized officer or
agent of the United States, in any respect, in the custody of his
prisoner, it would be his duty to resist it, and to call to his aid any force
that might be necessary to maintain the authority of law against illegal
interference. No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can
have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the
court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it
beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence.105

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

For a discussion of this, see FINKELMAN, supra note 27.
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
For a full history of the case, see H. ROBERT BAKER, THE RESCUE OF JOSHUA GLOVER: A
FUGITIVE SLAVE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (2006).
103. In re Booth & Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157 (1854).
104. Id. at 212.
105. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 524 (1859).
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Northern states’ rights claims would gain no support from the Supreme
Court. Nor was the U.S. Supreme Court troubled by the Fugitive Slave
Law of 1850. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Taney unambiguously
proclaimed: “the act of Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law
is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the
United States.”106 Taney noted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had
asserted its supremacy over the federal courts. This astounded the Chief
Justice as he noted:
These propositions are new in the jurisprudence of the United States,
as well as of the States; and the supremacy of the State courts over the
courts of the United States, in cases arising under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, is now for the first time asserted and acted
upon in the Supreme Court of a State.107

Ableman was a strongly nationalist opinion—as strong as anything
Justice Joseph Story or Chief Justice John Marshall might have written.
But it was proslavery nationalism. It upheld the Fugitive Slave Law of
1850 and emphatically rejected the antislavery jurisprudence of a
northern state. It was a decision slaveowners loved.
4. The Proslavery 1850s
The 1850s was a decade of enormous political success for the South
and slavery. In 1849, slavery was illegal in almost all of the federal
territories. After 1857, for the first time since the Constitution was
adopted, slavery was legal in every federal territory. In 1849, there was
a weak federal fugitive slave law with few viable enforcement
mechanisms. After 1850, the nation developed, for the first time in
American history, a national law enforcement bureaucracy, solely for the
purpose of returning fugitive slaves. In 1849, almost all the free states
emancipated visiting slaves with no constitutional restrictions. By 1857,
the Supreme Court had made it clear that it would strike down such
behavior at the first opportunity. In the 1840s, blacks were gaining
rights in the North, as Rhode Island enfranchised them and Ohio
repealed its black laws.108 Black lawyers were beginning to appear in
northern courts, and it seemed to be only a matter of time before some
black attorney would seek admission to the bar of the U.S. Supreme

106. Id. at 526.
107. Id. at 514.
108. Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the
Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 (1986).
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Court.109 By 1860, Congress and the president had teamed up to deny
every black in the nation the right to fundamental due process when
seized as a fugitive slave, and the Supreme Court had expanded this
deprivation of their status by holding that blacks could never be citizens
of the United States and that, under the Constitution, blacks “had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.”110
Finally, in the 1850s, Congress and the Courts worked in tandem to
undermine the rights of the free states to protect their black neighbors or
resist the encroachments of slavery into their communities.
III. SECESSION AND STATES RIGHTS
After a decade of spectacular success at the national level, in 186061 the most aggressive proslavery politicians led their states out of the
Union. Were they concerned about states’ rights? Was the right of the
states to control their own domestic institutions at the heart of secession?
The answer is clearly no.
There was not a single example of the deprivation of states’ rights
that southerners could complain about. The national government did not
threaten to end slavery in the states or even interfere with it. In his first
inaugural address, Lincoln reaffirmed this while quoting his own party’s
platform on this point:
Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern
States that by the accession of a Republican Administration their
property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered.
There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension.
Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while
existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the
published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote
from one of those speeches when I declare that—
I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the
institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no
lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.
Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge
that I had made this and many similar declarations and had never
recanted them; and more than this, they placed in the platform for my
acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and
emphatic resolution which I now read:
109. Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers as
Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1994).
110. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
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“Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the
States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its
own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively,
is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and
endurance of our political fabric depend; and we denounce the lawless
invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter
what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.”111

Lincoln certainly hated slavery, and always had.
But, he
understood the Constitution precisely as did John C. Calhoun or
Jefferson Davis: that the national government had no power to regulate
slavery in the states. Lincoln had “no inclination” to interfere with
slavery in the states because he had no power to do so; nor did any other
politician in the Lincoln administration or in Congress. Southern states’
rights had not been threatened in the 1850s and there was no threat to
them from the incoming administration. Whatever Lincoln’s policies
were towards the territories, there was no threat to states’ rights in the
South. The secession documents underscore this. Most of the
complaints of the seceding states are about national policies outside the
southern states or about actions of the North.
The most important state right that any of the southern states
claimed was that they had the “right” to secede. The secessionists
claimed that this right was rooted in the inherent sovereignty of the
states.
South Carolina noted that the Federal Government’s
“encroachments upon the reserved rights of the States, fully justified”
the state in “withdrawing from the Federal Union” and that “now the
State of South Carolina” had “resumed her separate and equal place
among nations.”112 Thus, the right to secession was rooted in a
particular view of states’ rights that most of the states of the Union had
never accepted. However, the substantive reasons for secession were not
the rights of the states. While rhetorically South Carolina and other
seceding states may have claimed that the national government had
“encroached” on their “reserved rights,” none of the seceding states
offered any examples of this, because in fact there were none. Instead,
all of their examples—the reasons they offered to justify secession—
were about national policy involving slavery in the territories, the
admission of new slave states, John Brown’s raid at Harpers Ferry,
northern opposition to slavery, the refusal of northern states to
111. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address—Final Text, Mar. 4, 1861, in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262-63 (1953).
112. Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South
Carolina from the Federal Union, supra note 8.
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aggressively help in the return of fugitives slaves, and the other actions
by northern state government that were hostile to slavery. Most of these
complaints were not in fact about the national government impinging on
southern states’ rights, rather they were complaints that the national
government had note impinged on northern states’ rights. Thus, there
are in fact, four significant ironies to the states’ rights issue and
secession.
First, because the Constitution of 1787 was deeply protective of
slavery, and the Supreme Court enhanced this protection, there was a
direct tie to nationalism and slavery. This meant that, before 1861, the
slave states did not need to have a states’ rights ideology to protect their
most important social and economic institutions. A nationalist position
did that for them. Most of the complaints about the national government
and slavery in the secessionist documents were not about the national
government impinging on southern states’ rights. For example, South
Carolina complained that the northern states were not helping to enforce
the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, and thus “laws of the General
Government have ceased to effect the objects of the Constitution.”113
Second, because the Constitution was proslavery and supporters of
slavery controlled the national government almost continuously from
1801 until 1861, the most important proponents of states’ rights in the
antebellum period were northern opponents of slavery. Northerners
needed to assert states’ rights in order to protect their free blacks from
kidnapping and protect their fugitive slave neighbors from being
returned to bondage. Thus, starting in the 1820s, most free states passed
personal liberty laws, which frustrated the implementation of the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1793. In the 1830s, courts in Pennsylvania, New
York, and New Jersey upheld state personal liberty laws that
undermined the 1793 law and effectively held that the 1793 law was
unconstitutional, in part on states’ rights grounds.114 In the early 1840s,
Governor William H. Seward of New York and three successive
governors of Maine refused to surrender northern free blacks wanted in
the South for helping slaves escape. Just before the Civil War,
Governors Salmon P. Chase and William Dennison of Ohio also refused

113. Id.
114. See State v. Sheriff of Burlington, No. 36286 (N.J. 1836) (also known as Nathan, Alias
Alex. Helmsley v. State); Jack v. Martin, 14 Wend. 507 (N.Y. 1835). State v. Sheriff of Burlington,
which is unreported, is discussed in Paul Finkelman, State Constitutional Protections of Liberty and
the Antebellum New Jersey Supreme Court: Chief Justice Hornblower and the Fugitive Slave Law
of 1793, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 753 (1992). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld its state personal
liberty law in an unreported opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.
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to surrender a free black who had helped a slave escape.115 These
northern governors rested their actions on states’ rights arguments.116
Finally, after the Supreme Court struck down the first wave of northern
personal liberty laws in Prigg,117 many northern states responded with
new laws, which simply withdrew all northern cooperation in the return
of fugitive slaves.118 This was a variant of states’ rights philosophy. In
these laws, passed in the 1840s and more so in the next decade after the
adoption of the fugitive slave law of 1850, the northern states took the
position that their states did not have to cooperate with the federal
government. In doing so, they made enforcement of the 1850 law
difficult, or in some places, nearly impossible.
Third, the most aggressive states’ rights arguments of the
antebellum decade came from northerners, particularly judges in
Ohio,119 New York,120 and most of all Wisconsin.121 In response to the
Oberlin-Wellington rescue in Ohio, that state’s supreme court came
within one vote of causing a confrontation with the federal government
by issuing a writ of habeas corpus directed at the U.S. marshal in
Cleveland.122 The Wisconsin Supreme Court was not so circumspect
and in fact issued a writ of habeas corpus that forced U.S. Marshall
Stephen Ableman to surrender the abolitionist Sherman Booth after he
had been arrested for helping rescue a fugitive slave. In New York, in
Lemmon v. The People, the state’s highest court rejected any measure of
comity towards visiting southerners.123 Here, the state emancipated
eight Virginia slaves who were brought into the state for just long
enough to take the next steamboat to New Orleans.124 They were in the
city only because New York was the only east coast port that had direct
transit to New Orleans. The decision in Lemmon was legitimate within
115. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
116. Paul Finkelman, States Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in AN UNCERTAIN
TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 125-58 (Kermit L. Hall &
James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989); Paul Finkelman, The Protection of Black Rights in Seward’s New
York, 34 CIV. WAR HIS. 211-34 (1988); Paul Finkelman, States’ Rights, Federalism, and Criminal
Extradition in Antebellum America: The New York-Virginia Controversy, 1839-1846, in GERMAN
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT: CONTEXTS, INTERACTION, AND HISTORICAL
REALITIES 293-327 (Hermann Wellenreuther ed., 1990).
117. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
118. See generally MORRIS, supra note 26.
119. Ex parte Bushnell, Ex parte Langston, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859).
120. Lemmon v. The People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
121. In re Booth & Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157 (1854), rev’d, Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
506 (1859).
122. Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. at 77.
123. Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 565.
124. Id.
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the context of American constitutional law and state police powers. But,
southerners believed this decision, and similar ones in other states,
violated the spirit of the Union and the comity that should be given to
citizens of other states. In addition, some southerners believed the
decision in Lemmon actually violated the Commerce Clause or the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution because it denied
southerners the right to travel throughout the United States with their
constitutionally protected property and it interfered with interstate
commerce.
Finally, while southerners proclaimed their support for states’
rights, they insisted that the road to states’ rights ran in only one
direction. They denied that northerners had a right to assert their states’
rights when it came to slavery. Thus, for example, South Carolina
complained that the northern states
assume the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic
institutions; and have denied the rights of property established in
fifteen of the States and recognized by the Constitution; they have
denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted
open establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is
to disturb the peace and to eloign the property of the citizens of other
States.125

In other words, South Carolina opposed the idea that the free states
could have their “states’ rights” to allow antislavery organizations to
operate. Similarly, South Carolina denounced the Lemmon decision as a
violation of comity without any sense of the irony that it was actually
opposing states’ rights. Significantly, since the 1820s, South Carolina
had successfully refused to allow northern free black sailors to enter its
ports. Almost every other southern state with an ocean port passed a
similar black seamen’s law. Under these laws, free black sailors were
jailed while their ships were in southern ports and were only released
when the ship was about to sail, if the ship captain paid the jailer for
feeding and housing these sailors. Although believing such laws
violated the Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and the treaty
power, Justice William Johnson, while riding circuit, refused to interfere
with the enforcement of these laws.126 The southern states insisted that
states’ rights empowered them to arrest free black sailors (or any other
free blacks) entering their jurisdiction. In the 1840s, Massachusetts sent
125. Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South
Carolina from the Federal Union, supra note 8.
126. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 496-98 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823).
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commissioners to South Carolina and Louisiana to negotiate some
accommodation for free black sailors from the North, but both states
refused to meet with the commissioners and basically expelled them.127
Ironically then, the southern states argued that states’ rights allowed
them to decide who they would let into their states. But, when
northerners applied the same logic to visiting southerners with slaves,
South Carolina suddenly rejected its support for states’ rights, and
argued this was grounds for secession.
Thus, in the end, secession was not based on the need of the
southern states to protect their states’ rights from an aggressive national
government. On the contrary, the southern states argued that they were
leaving because the northern states insisted on using their own states’
rights to oppose slavery. Nor was it about the “encroachments” of the
national government, because there were none. Nor could it be about the
failure of the national government to protect slavery. Federal troops had
been used to suppress John Brown’s invasion of Harpers Ferry, Virginia.
Federal troops had been used to bring the fugitive slave Anthony Burns
out of Boston. The national government had expended enormous
resources to prosecute people who rescued, or tried to rescue, fugitive
slaves in New York,128 Massachusetts,129 Pennsylvania,130 Ohio, 131
Wisconsin,132 Illinois,133 and elsewhere.
While many of those
prosecutions were unsuccessful, there were convictions in Ohio after the
Oberlin rescue, in Wisconsin after the Joshua Glover rescue, and in other
places. While Wisconsin may have resisted the fugitive slave law in
Sherman Booth’s case, the government won in the end and Booth’s
printing press was seized and sold for the benefit of the slave owner,134
and after the Supreme Court decision, Booth went to jail and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to intervene.135 Despite the intense

127. Finkelman, States Rights North and South in Antebellum America, supra note 116.
128. United States v. Cobb, 25 F. Cas. 481 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1857); United States v. Reed, 27 F.
Cas. 727 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852).
129. United States v. Stowell, 27 F. Cas. 1350 (C.C.D. Mass. 1854); United States v. Scott, 27
F. Cas. 990 (D. Mass. 1851); United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
130. United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851).
131. JACOB R. SHIPHERD, HISTORY OF THE OBERLIN-WELLINGTON RESCUE (Boston, John P.
Jewett & Co. 1859).
132. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); United States v. Rycraft, 27 F. Cas.
918 (D. Wis. 1854).
133. United States v. Hossack, 26 F. Cas. 378 (N.D. Ill. 1860) (unreported). For a full
discussion of this case, see PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM 128-34 (1985).
134. In June 1861, after the Civil War had begun, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the
validity of this sale in Arnold v. Booth, 14 Wis. 180 (1861).
135. Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 498 (1859).
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opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law in northern Ohio, the Buchanan
administration managed to cobble together two juries made up of
supporters of the law and convict two of the Oberlin rescuers.136 The
Ohio Supreme Court refused to assert its states’ rights to release the
Oberlin rescuers from federal custody.137
This history showed a growing northern states’ rights opposition to
slavery but also a firm federal support of slavery that, if anything,
trampled on the states’ rights of the North. But for the seceding states,
these northern developments were intolerable. So too were northern
demands for political actions against the spread of slavery. Georgia
could not complain that slavery was excluded from the federal territories
because it was allowed in all the federal territories in 1860. Georgia
could only complain that “Northern anti-slavery men of all parties
asserted the right to exclude slavery from the territory by Congressional
legislation and demanded the prompt and efficient exercise of this power
to that end,” and that these demands were “insulting and
unconstitutional.”138 Georgia complained that the incoming Lincoln
administration was opposed to allowing slavery in the territories, and
this justified secession. In other words, without any legislation on the
table, Georgia claimed it could leave the Union because it opposed the
platform of the new president. Secession was not about “states’ rights,”
but about political power. Southerners did not like the outcome of the
presidential election, so they claimed the right to leave the Union.
Mississippi was equally appalled at northern states’ rights actions
and beliefs. Mississippi complained that northerners had “broken the
compact which our fathers pledged their faith to maintain.”139 This was
because in the North “hostility” to slavery “advocates negro equality,
socially and politically, and promotes insurrection and incendiarism in
our midst.”140 This hostility had “enlisted” the North’s “press, its pulpit
and its schools against us, until the whole popular mind of the North is
excited and inflamed with prejudice.”141 Northerners had “made
combinations and formed associations to carry out” their “schemes of
emancipation in the States and wherever else slavery exists.”142 In other
words, northerners exercised their rights of free speech, freedom of
136. SHIPHERD, supra note 131.
137. Ex parte Bushnell, Ex parte Langston, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859).
138. Georgia Secession, supra note 9.
139. A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of the
State of Mississippi from the Federal Union, supra note 10.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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religion, and state political autonomy to support policies the South did
not like. The issues were not based on constitutionalism or states’
rights, but on political power and the power of ideas. Southerners left
the Union because they disagreed with northerners. Mississippi
complained that northerners believed in “negro equality”143 and this was
enough to justify secession.
Texas also asserted that it was leaving the Union because of
northern states’ rights, not the denial of southern states’ rights. The
Texans complained:
The States of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin,
Michigan and Iowa, by solemn legislative enactments, have
deliberately, directly or indirectly violated the 3rd clause of the 2nd
section of the 4th article [the fugitive slave clause] of the federal
constitution, and laws passed in pursuance thereof; thereby annulling a
material provision of the compact, designed by its framers to
perpetuate the amity between the members of the confederacy and to
secure the rights of the slave-holding States in their domestic
institutions—a provision founded in justice and wisdom, and without
the enforcement of which the compact fails to accomplish the object of
its creation.144

Like the secessionists in Mississippi, Texans complained that
northerners refused to agree with them on the fundamental inequality of
blacks. Texans declared they had to leave the Union because
northerners were “proclaiming the debasing doctrine of equality of all
men, irrespective of race or color—a doctrine at war with nature, in
opposition to the experience of mankind, and in violation of the plainest
revelations of Divine Law.”145
In the end, the root of secession was just as Alexander Stephens
said: racism and slavery. For the first time in its history, the United
States had elected a president who was prepared to stand up to the
demands of slavery and fight its spread. He had no power—and thus no
inclination—to interfere with slavery in the states. He would not
trample on the states’ rights of the South. But, he would fight slavery on
the political level. Northerners agreed with him. Having legitimately

143. Most northern whites of course did not believe in racial equality.
144. A Declaration of the Causes which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal
Union, reprinted in Yale Law School, Confederate States of America: Documents, JOURNAL OF THE
SECESSION CONVENTION OF TEXAS 61-66 (E.W. Winkler), available at http://sunsite.utk.edu/civilwar/reasons.html (last visited May 11, 2012).
145. Id.
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lost the election, southerners had two choices. They could accept the
outcome of the election and participate in politics. Or, they could turn
against their own country.
In 1860-61, southerners could not legitimately claim, as their
ancestors had in the Declaration of Independence, that they were being
denied a place at the political table or a voice in the political process.
Americans in 1776 had no political voice in Britain, no seats in
Parliament, and no vote. Southerners held almost half the seats in the
Senate and with their northern Democratic allies they could control that
body; they were a majority of the Supreme Court, and of the four
northerners on the Court only the aging John McLean—the longest
serving Justice—was even moderately opposed to slavery, and he had
voted in favor of the Fugitive Slave Laws on a number of occasions.146
While a minority in the House of Representatives, southerners had still
been able to pass enormously significant legislation supporting slavery
in the previous decade.
Thus, the decision to leave the Union was not about access to
politics; it was about whether southerners could win every election, or
control any northerner who won, thus maintaining their version of racial
hegemony, and protecting slavery. Having lost the election, they feared
they would lose more in the future. While most northerners rejected full
racial equality, blacks voted in some northern states and had some rights
in all the free states. This, along with hostility to slavery, was reason
enough to leave the Union. The decision was of course a disaster.
Southern leaders believed their own ideology and followed their
prejudices down a horrible road that led to war and destruction. Slavery
was safe within the Union, where the Constitution protected slavery at
every turn,147 and where the South had a perpetual veto over all
Constitutional amendments.148
But once the South rejected the Constitution, and southerners who
had taken an oath to defend the Constitution made war on their own
country, the protections were gone. In the end, secession led to exactly
what the southern disunionists—some might call them the southern
146. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 215 (1847). On McLean and antislavery, see Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate
Abolitionist and Supreme Court Politician, 62 VANDERBILT L. REV. 519 (2009).
147. For a discussion of the proslavery nature of the Constitution, see PAUL FINKELMAN,
SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (2d ed. 2001).
148. It takes three-fourths of the states to ratify a constitutional amendment. In 1860 there
were fifteen slave states. If all of these states had remained in the Union, to this day, in 2012, it
would be impossible to end slavery by amendment, since it would take forty-five free states to
outvote the fifteen slave states.
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traitors—feared most:
an end to slavery, and at least formal
constitutional equality for all American, no matter what their race. It led
to what Lincoln memorably called a New Birth of Freedom.

